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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Torts-Deceit-Oral Promise to Buy Land.-In an action of tort for
fraud, the plaintiff had alleged that defendants took part in an auction sale
of property and it was knocked down to them on their bid of $12,225.00
which succeeded an alleged bona fide bid of $12,200.00. Upon demand of a
required 10% deposit, defendants represented that they did not have the
money with them nor had the money in the bank upon which a check could be
drawn. Plaintiff then informed them that a $500.00 deposit would be ac-
ceptable and defendants represented that payment would be made at their
place of business in the afternoon. Plaintiff went there several times and
each time they made some excuse about not paying and finally told her that
they would pay only $10,750.00 for the property. Plaintiff refused and
subsequent efforts to sell being unsuccessful, a second auction was held at
which the property was sold for $10,350.00. The plaintiff charged that all
of the bids made by the defendants were fraudulently made with no intention
of complying therewith for the purpose of blocking the sale of the property,
as it was known to them that the plaintiff must sell immediately to prevent
foreclosure, and they might thus be able to obtain the property for less, and
she therefore claims damages for the difference between the amount of the
next highest bid at the first auction and the price at which the property did
sell and subsequent expenses. Held, demurrer to the sufficiency of the com-
plaint should have been upheld.'
It is quite true that the Indiana Supreme Court "has repeatedly said that
actionable fraud cannot be predicated upon a promise to do a thing in the
future although there may be no intention of fulfilling the promise."'2 But
it is questionable if this rule has evolved from or should be applied to
actions of tort for deceit. Of the cases cited by the majority opinion in
support of this principle, not one was of that class. What does the com-
plainant seek in a tort action? Not to be put into the position that he would
have occupied if the promise had been performed, which is the contractual
remedy for an unperformed promise, but to be placed in the position he would
have been in if the injury had not occurred,3 i.e., if the promise had not
been made. It is the latter which the appellee sought here. As set out by
Judge Treanor in his dissenting opinion, "The appellee is not seeking com-
pensation for a loss legally caused by appellants failure to carry out their
oral contract; she is complaining of the loss occasioned by her failure to sell
to the second highest bidder and the facts alleged show that this failure was
caused by the fraudulent conduct of the appellants." 4
Yet in upholding the demurrer of the appellants that the appellee had
shown no cause of action, the court cited cases wherein the plaintiff sought
his remedy either in contract or in equitable proceedings to quiet title or
regain property conveyed. An analysis of those cases shows no necessary
domination of the principal case.
In Hayes v. Burkam5 the plaintiff sought damages for defendants non-
performance of a promise to sign a surety bond. Bethell v. Bethell6 was an
action of covenant, and although the court set out that where a party merely
promises to do a thing in the future, there can be.no fraud, yet a recovery
of the purchase money paid for land was ordered where the defendant did
1 Sachs v. Blewett (1933), 185 N. E. 856 (Ind.).
2 Sachs v. Blewett (1933), 185 N. E. 856 (Ind.); Callaghan's Ind. Digest, Vol. 7,
sec. 9, 15 N. E. D. 143, 144.
3 McCormick, Damages in Actions for Fraud and Deceit (1933), 28 Ill. L. Rev.
1051; In re Scheupler, Chadwick, and Burnham (1933), 63 F. (2d) 241; Willis, Law
of Damages (1910), sec. 14, 52.
4 Sachs v. Blewett (1934), 188 N. E. 674 (Ind.).
5 (1895) 51 Ind. 130.
0 (1883) 92 Ind. 318.
RECENT CASE NOTES
not include certain required covenants in the deed as he had promised he
would. Again in Balue v. Taylor 7 the plaintiff, although alleging numerous
fraudulent acts, sought to recover damages due to defendant's breach of a
promise to pay cash and convey certain property in settlement of a previously
alleged fraudulent transaction by the defendant, and here also, relief was
granted in accordance with the complaint. Burt v. Bowless was an action
to set aside a conveyance made for an unwritten promise by the defendant
to convey other property and the bill was granted, while Robinson v. Rein-
hart9 was an action to quiet title where the plaintiffs had conveyed their
land under misrepresentations made to them. The conveyance was set aside
and title quieted, the court, quoting from Bethell v. Bethell, adding, "* * *
there is more than a mere failure to make good a promise; there is deceit,
misrepresentation, abuse of confidence * * • ,,0
In each of these cases, the rule set out above was used by the court, but
since the pleadings and results are so varied, it is submitted that the court
in the principal case should have immediately proceeded to a solution of the
problem solely upon the principles of tort law. Possibly the court rightfully
feared to diminish. the efficacy of the Statute of Frauds by permitting any
action to be based upon this promise to buy land which was not in writing,
but this action was in tort, seeking recovery for damages which followed "a
false representation, fraudulently made, which entitled the plaintiff to rely
thereon."'" The following dictum in the case, however, eviatences the court's
failure to make this distinction. "If the appellant's contract to buy had been
in writing, they would be responsible in damages for its breach, regardless
of their good or bad intention at the time it was made. But the action would
arise out of the contract and not in tort. Since the contract was not in
writing, the breach of it cannot be made the basis of an action, and the
fact that at the time it was made, they did not intend to carry it out makes
their liability for the breach no greater than if they had intended to comply
with it."12
Undoubtedly the court soughc to prevent every disgruntled contractor
from seeking a remedy in tort for deceit, and the above statements were quite
true in that the appellants liability for their breach of contract is unaffected.
But what of their liability in tort for fraudulent bidding and misrepresenta-
tion of intent? "It is very generally held that fraud may be predicated of a
promise accompanied by a present intent not to perform.' 3 "To profess
an intent to do or not to do when the party intends the contrary is as clear
a case of misrepresentation-and of fraud as could be made."'14 This follows
from the even more generally accepted basis that a misrepresentation of a
present state of mind is to be treated as any other misrepresentation of fact. 15
7 (1894) 136 Ind. 368, 36 N. E. 2, 69.
8 (1879) 69 Ind. 1.
9 (1894) 137 Ind. 674, 36 N. E. 519..
10 (1894) 137 Ind. 674, 682.
11 Harper, Law of Torts (1933), sec. 217.
12 Sachs v. Blewett (1933), 1 Ind. Adv. Rep. 584, 592.
13 12 R. C. L. 261, 51 A. L. R..63; (1932) 18 St. Louis- L. Rev. 166.
14 Herndon v. Durham & S. R. Co. (1913), 161 N. C. 650, 656, 77 S. E. 683, 685;
(1929) 38 Yale L. J. 544; Harper, Law of Torts (1933), sec. 220.
15 Edgington v. Fitzmaurice (1882), 29 Ch. Div. 459; Bayse v. Bayse (1899),
152 Ind. 172, 52 N. E. 797; Adams v. Schiffer (1887), 11 Colo. 15, 17 Pac. 21;
Pocatello Security Trust Co. v. Henry (1922), 35 Idaho 321, 27 A. L. R. 337, 206
Pac. 175; Miller-Cahoon Co. v. Wade (1923), 38 Idaho 484, 221 Pac. 1102; Daniel
v. Daniel (1921), 190 Ky. 210, 226 S. W. 1070; Laing v. McKee (1865), 13 Mieh.
124, 87 Am. Dec- 738; Kritzer v. Moffatt (1925), 136 Wash. 416, 44 A. L. R. 681, 240
Pac. 355.
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Unfortunately, the Indiana decisions are found listed among the small
group holding to the minority of these viewpoints, 16 partially due of course
to the use in our decisions of the rule discussed in the early part of this
note, but in an annotation to the principal case,'- the American Law Reports
cite three recent cases which still follow such reasoning as compared with
forty-three recent cases which are placed within the rules set out here as to
promises made without present intent to perform. It is submitted that this
jurisdiction need not have considered itself so bound by previous decisions
as to prevent its reaching a more just and desirable result. H. A. A.
Workmen's Compensation-Who Is an "Employee" Under the Act.-
This was an appeal from an award made by the majority of the full Indus-
trial Board of Indiana. From an award denying compensation to appellant
for the death of her husband, the appellant appealed to the Appellate Court
of Indiana. The case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts, which
showed that at the time of his death, decedent had the title of vice-president
of appellee, Dusenberg, Incorporated, then under the control of the Auburn
Automobile Company. The services the decedent rendered appellee con-
sisted solely of carrying on appellee's engineering and experimental work,
of which he was in charge, and of drawing plans of automobiles and motors,
as well as often supervising and aiding in their construction. For these
services decedent was paid a yearly compensation of $15,000. Decedent
also owned a small portion of the stock of appellee, but was at all times
under the direction and control of superior officers, so that even his hiring
and discharge of the engineers working under him was subject to approval.
While driving a car, belonging to appellee and under appellee's orders,
decedent met with the accident which resulted in his death. The only ques-
tion in dispute was whether decedent was an employee of the appellee within
the meanings of the statute. Held, decedent was not an "employee" within
the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.'
The question of who is an "employee" under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act is a perplexing problem. In the instant case, there were two judges
dissenting; one so strongly that a separate dissenting opinion has appeared.2
To analyse the problem of the principal case successfully it is first necessary
to examine the general provisions of the statute as well as the general rules
of law applicable to such provisions, both in Indiana and neighboring states
before dealing with the specific cases referred to in the majority opinion.
The Workmen's Compensation Act providing for compensation to be
paid employees by employers for personal injury or death by accident arising
out of or in the course of employment, also 3 provides that unless the context
otherwise requires, "The term 'employee' as used in this act shall be con-
strued to include every person, including a minor, in the service of another,
under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or implied, except one
whose employment is both casual and not in the usual course of the trade,
business, occupation or profession of the employer." 4
The Act, thus includes employees in all industrial pursuits, except those
expressly exempted, 5 namely, casual laborers, farm or agricultural employees
16 12 R. C. L. 262, 51 A. L. R. 78.
17 91 A. L. R. 1297.
1 Duesenberg v. Duesenberg, Inc. (1933), 187 N. E. 750 (Ind. App.).
2 Duesenberg v. Duesenberg, Inc. (1934), 190 N. E. 894 (Ind. App.).
3 Baldwin's Ind. Stat. (1934), Sec. 16378.
4 Baldwin's Ind. Stat. (1934), Sec. 16449 (b).
5 In re Boyer (1917), 65 Ind. App. 408, 117 N. E. 507.
